Perlo's engagement with the complex and ambiguous relationship between Marxism (and, more broadly, the socialist traditions) and the moral status of animals is very much to be welcomed.
In Agreement
My impression is that Perlo and I would agree about all this. What I particularly liked about the piece was its refusal to de ne and condemn the Marxist tradition because of undoubted contradictions and ambivalences on the question of the moral status of animals and the political validity of campaigns on their behalf. Though I am not a great advocate of the term "dialectics," I think Perlo makes positive use of it in recognizing the ways in which these contradictions can be, and have been, re-worked to create new and more defensible acknowledgments of the moral and political importance of the struggles against human-imposed animal suffering. The paper also is right, it seems to me, in noting a tendency in more recent developments of Marxism to extend the circle of concern from the industrial working class to other oppressed, exploited, or stigmatized groups. Of course, this was most clearly the case in the transference of Marxism to third-world anti-imperialist struggles when the main social base for Marxist politics, in the absence of a large urban-industrial sector, was peasant farmers. However, I would take issue with Perlo's tendency to see this extension of the circle of concern in terms of an ever-wider extension of the concept of class. I think it is better to maintain the relatively well-de ned concept of class to denote exploitative socioeconomic relations grounded in ownership/non-ownership of means of production, while giving full recognition to the moral and political importance of forms of inequality, oppression, or exclusion that are not reducible to class in this traditional sense. There are theoretical reasons for doing this, but also it has the pragmatic advantage of clearly favoring a differencerespecting coalition as against the classic Marxian notion of a single "vanguard" party.
Differences and Misunderstandings
However, other, deeper issues do separate Perlo's and my thinking. In some respects, these have to do with misinterpretations of some of the things I have written, but in other ways they represent differences of overall position.
Misunderstandings rst. Two in particular need to be cleared up. One is the claim that I "attack" vegetarianism. I do no such thing. For reasons I'll explain, I did not focus my discussion around the issue of diet. In fact, my book men-
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Ted Benton tioned vegetarianism only twice-once in parentheses and once in a footnote.
Neither statement could seriously be construed as an attack. In fact, I think the widespread shift in the direction of vegetarianism is very much to be welcomed for several reasons. My main point was to argue that the degree of integration in our industrialized system of food production and processing makes it virtually, if not actually, impossible to live without using or consuming products tainted by animal abuse. Not only are animal derivatives used in a massive range of non-meat products (such as sweets, medicines), but the environmental destructiveness of industrialized arable agriculture poisons both domestic and wild animals and systematically eliminates the habitats of the latter. Vegetarians may make a valuable and symbolic moral statement; but, as with green consumerism, political action to bring about social and economic change is still necessary.
The other misunderstanding concerns the quotation Perlo uses to imply that I advocate satisfying human needs at the expense of those of animals where these con ict (p. 16). In fact, all this quotation says is that on either of the views of justice that I had been discussing, it is possible to give such preference to humans. That I do not endorse this, but regard it as a problem for these views of justice, is made clear in the next sentence: "The thesis of moral obligation to animals is required to offset any tendency to abuse the licensing of differential treatment. . . ." I also conclude the paragraph with the following: "This is, admittedly, a sketchy and merely preliminary gesture in the direction of a solution of some of these problems. Further development of the position in the face of critical responses will be required. . . . " Benton (1993, p. 215) . I draw attention to this because my book and the articles it drew on were in some respects pioneering attempts to engage with these issues, and I was quite explicit about their status as an exploratory enquiry rather than as delivering de nitive solutions.
So, on to the residual differences of position. I was a bit disappointed that Perlo chose to engage with my work through selected out-of-context quotation-rather than presenting the general line of argument-but this is understandable and probably my fault: complicated and dense, the book probably tried to do too much at once. My main aim was to add a further dimension to the already up-and-running dialogue between greens and socialists-consideration of the moral status of animals and the relation of animal rights struggles to the other two social movements. So, the rst point is that I was trying to relate socialism with both green and animal rights issues at the same time, whereas Perlo doesn't really deal with the complexities and dilemmas that arise when animal rights and wider green issues are put into dialogue with each other. Second, the notion of dialogue, like Perlo's own use of "dialectic," implies reciprocity. For me, this meant using each of the "corners" of the triangular debate as a standpoint from which to call into question assumptions made by the others. Whereas Perlo takes her stand with an unquestioned animal rights position, of which vegetarianism seems to be the crux, my investigation used insights from both Marxism and socialist moral thinking to raise questions about the best way to defend animal well-being, while at the same time using the animal rights perspective as a basis for critiquing "orthodox" Marxism. (I had already attempted to do the same thing in relation to Marxism and green thought in a series of articles and book chapters).
On Animal Rights
Although Perlo seems to think I oppose the rights-view, in fact I defend Tom
Regan's rights-case from the standard philosophical criticisms of it. I do think it makes sense to assign rights to nonhuman animals, and pressing this case morally and in legal reform can bene t some categories of nonhuman animals. This is not in dispute as far as I am concerned. My point was more to do with the limits of liberal rights as applied to nonhuman animals. Most philosophical discussion of the issue remains at the conceptual level, whereas I drew on a long legacy of radical (including both Marxist and feminist) critique of liberal rights in relation to humans. The core of this is that there is a huge gap, on the one hand, between formally assigning universal rights and, on the other, enabling the subjects of rights to effectively exercise those rights. Ironically, the poorest and least powerful in society are those most in need of the protection of rights, yet also the least able to enforce respect of them. The abstract individualism of liberal rights theory makes it dif cult to see this as a problem. I argued that the problem is still more profound in the case of nonhuman animals because their vulnerability to abuse is greater than that of oppressed humans and their ability to enforce rights on their own behalf non-existent. My argument, therefore, was that we need to supplement the liberal rights approach with a more structurally sensitive (socialist) concept of rights, combined with other moral and political arguments for deep level social and economic change.
A second limitation of the rights approach has to do with its scope and logical underpinning. For Regan, only those animals who can be regarded as "subjects of a life" qualify for rights. Ethically this is problematic, since it extends the circle of moral concern to individuals of other species in virtue of their sharing psychological attributes with us: In short, the position remains residually anthropocentric despite its intentions. There are related problems about scope: In so far as rights offer de facto protection at all, they do so only to a small sub-set of animals-generally the cuddly, furry ones. What if our resistance to anthropocentrism takes us to a moral concern for the well-being of sh, reptiles, amphibians, invertebrates, and even, in the light of green sensibilities, of plants, habitats, and eco-systems? Talk of rights increasingly looses persuasive power here, and we clearly need a more differentiated moral vocabulary. The trouble with Perlo's unexamined reliance on the notion of rights is that it doesn't address this diversity among nonhuman animals.
Despite its intentions, it remains locked into the monolithic human/animal dichotomy. This allows of no other options but submergence of human difference into an undifferentiated category of the animal or preservation of the traditional western hierarchy, with humans lording it over the animals.
Emphasis on Kinship and Interdependence
A central part of my argument was to emphasize kinship and interdependence between humans and other species, while recognizing the speci city of the mode of life and conditions for well-being proper to each species. A reasonable moral implication to draw from this is that we need a differentiated moral vocabulary to deal with the speci cs of our encounters with other species. At the very least, this means being able to differentiate between the moral requirements on us when we deal with other apes, with farm animals, companion animals (pets), dragon ies, orchids, and wild-ower meadows.
In part, this is a matter of the nature and needs of different sorts of animal (and plant). Neither dogs nor dolphins could do anything with the right to vote. But dogs are members of human societies in ways that dolphins are not. This is another dimension of difference-a social relational as distinct from ontological one. My argument here differentiates quite strongly between the two sorts of case. Justice to dogs implies an obligation to look after their interests, to establish and maintain benign relationships with them. Cruelty and neglect are the main categories of moral offence against them. By contrast, justice to dolphins implies getting off their backs-it means interfering with their lives and affecting their habitats as minimally as possible, simply letting them be.
Conclusion
Perlo seems to assimilate all my argument to the former sort of case, whereas she tends to universalize the latter, wishing to abolish practices in which animals have been rendered dependent on human care as inherently exploita- 
